Examining the durable solutions capacities in Kismayo and Afgoye

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About Somali Public Agenda

Somali Public Agenda is a non-profit public policy and administration research organisation based in Mogadishu. Its aim is to advance understanding and improvement of public administration and public services in Somalia through evidence-based research and analysis.

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1 Introduction

Internal displacement and refugee repatriation in Somalia are closely tied to the dynamics of climate change and environmental degradation, and in addition to a highly volatile security context. Somalia is currently experiencing severe drought caused by successive failures of the rains, resulting in the third food emergency in a decade. Looking at the ways people have responded to previous periods of acute food shortages, it is clear that internal displacement – particularly movement towards cities and towns from rural areas – is a key coping strategy, as basic livelihood facilities can be accessed in urban areas.

A durable solution is achieved, according to the InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC), ‘when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement.’¹ Three potential durable solutions are generally recognised: sustainable return or repatriation, sustainable local integration in the site of displacement, or sustainable resettlement to a new country or area.

The ability and capacity of the federal member states in Somalia to respond to the new displacement, and to work towards securing durable solutions for those who have already been displaced or returned from refugee camps, as well as for local communities in areas affected by displacement, is critical.

Over the past several years, Somalia has developed a progressive approach to durable solutions for displaced populations at the central government level. The 2019 National Policy on Refugees, Returnees, and IDPs [internally displaced persons] takes an inclusive approach to meeting the needs and respecting the rights of displaced and returnee populations, and of the communities that host them. Structurally, the federal (central) government has included support for the displaced and returnees in its ninth National Development Plan (NDP9) and has vested responsibility for the monitoring of progress in this regard with a Durable Solutions Unit that sits within the Ministry of Planning, Investment, and Economic Development. In many ways, these steps have established a model of good practice for other countries in the region. Sudan, for instance, is also establishing a Durable Solutions Unit at the central level, which has been inspired in part by Somalia’s example. Moreover, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has developed a National Durable Solutions Strategy 2020–2024, which outlines the FGS’s strategic visions and goals to better serve vulnerable members of society.

Somalia’s governance structure is intended to be decentralised (the country adopted a federal system in 2004 and four federal member states – Jubaland, South West, Galmudug and Hirshabelle – were established between 2013 and 2016). With many people moving not only towards Mogadishu but also towards secondary cities and towns, much of the responsibility for

implementing durable solutions rests with the federal member states.

There are varied approaches to durable solutions policy and programming at federal member state level. This report considers the priorities and experiences of displacement-affected communities. It further discusses the durable solutions administrative structures, policies and implementation in two federal member states, namely Jubaland and South West, particularly in Kismayo and Afgoye. In so doing, it aims to determine the extent to which durable solutions approaches have been incorporated into regional development plans, municipal governance plans or other vehicles of inclusion, and what the practical outputs of this work have been. Further, the report looks at the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on durable solutions work, what the local authorities are doing to address the effects of IDP settlements on the environment and on shared and limited natural resources, and what more they could be doing.

Understanding these aspects is vital for maximising the efforts and investments towards durable solutions of governmental, nongovernmental (NGOs), donor and private sector actors outside the central level in Mogadishu. The analysis may also help inform responses to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation throughout the country. Such a decentralised approach is particularly important given the political changes that have taken place at the centre recently, most notably involving the re-election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to replace Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. The current federal member states were established during Hassan Sheikh’s first tenure (September 2012–February 2017), and his government is promoting the devolution of services to regional and local levels.

2 Methodology

The study was conducted in two cities – Kismayo in Jubaland and Afgoye in South West between 23 August and 19 September 2022. The research methodology was primarily qualitative and involved interviews in Kismayo and Afgoye with government officials involved in durable solutions planning and programming, including federal member state and municipal officials, with implementing partners and with international organisation (INGO) staff. Focus group discussions (FGDs) were held with IDPs, returnees and local host communities (two FGDs per group).

The study examined five thematic issues:

- assessment of durable solutions work being undertaken at federal member state level;
- The coordination mechanisms of durable solutions units at federal, state and local levels;
- priorities and experiences of displacement-affected communities;
- impact of climate change and environmental degradation on durable solutions work;
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- involvement of nongovernmental, donor and private sector actors.

The research, which constitutes what the Research and Evidence Facility (REF) terms a medium research study, involved the following:

- 25 key informants were interviewed in Kismayo (14) and Afgoye (11);
- 12 FGDs were conducted in Kismayo (six) and Afgoye (six);

A total of 146 interviewees (including 25 key informants and 121 FGD participants) took part in the study. The study also involved capacity building with the team of researchers, in the form of training in research methodology, in Nairobi in June 2022.

A breakdown of methods and types of informants is given in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Number of informants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government officials involved in durable solutions planning and programming, including federal regional state and municipal officials, implementing partners and international organisation staff in Kismayo and Afgoye</td>
<td>Key informant interviews</td>
<td>14 in Kismayo and 11 in Afgoye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>40 participants in Kismayo and Afgoye (20 in each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>41 participants in Kismayo (20) and Afgoye (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>40 participants in Kismayo and Afgoye (20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The key informants interviewed in Kismayo included four officials from the government – representatives from the durable solutions unit of the Ministry of Planning, a member from the Jubaland Commission for Refugees and IDPs (JUCRI), and representatives from the Middle Shabelle region and Kismayo local administration; four officials from local and international NGOs – including NRC and the Somali Women Solidarity Organisation (SWSO); three representatives from civil society, representing youth and women’s organisations and universities; and two representatives from the private sector, including a water provision company. The key informants interviewed in Afgoye included the Director-General and a department head of the South West Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management; the durable solutions unit officer of South West; the Afgoye contact person for the Southwest Ministry of Planning; the Afgoye district head of social affairs; the Durable Solutions Officer for Concern International; the Peace Officer at Somali Peace Line; small shop owners; an electricity company representative; a university head; and a clan elder.
In Afgoye, the composition of the FGDs was:

- Two FGDs with IDPs:
  - FGD 1 for five female and five male young people;
  - FGD 2 for 10 male elders from the displaced community.
- Two FGDs with returnees:
  - FGD 1 for five female and five male young people;
  - FGD 2 for 11 male elders from among the returnees.
- Two FGDs with the host community:
  - FGD 1 for five female and five male young people.
  - FGD 2 for 10 male elders from the host community.

Similarly, in Kismayo, the focus group participants were organised as follows:

- Two FGDs with IDPs:
  - FGD 1 for five female and five male young people;
  - FGD 2 for five male elders and five women from the displaced community.
- Two FGDs with returnees:
  - FGD 1 for five female and five male young people;
  - FGD 2 for six male elders and four women from among the returnees.
- Two FGDs with the host community:
  - FGD 1 for five female and five male young people;
  - FGD 2 for five male elders and five intellectuals from the host community.

The researchers encountered several challenges during the study period. Security challenges were prevalent in both Afgoye and Kismayo. For that reason, the researchers were unable to spend nights in Afgoye. The research team decided to visit the district and come back to Mogadishu every day, even though land mine incidents along the road were possible. As the locals told them, Wednesdays were the most likely day for trouble to erupt, since the government collects taxes on Wednesdays; this causes tax collectors to be targeted in the market and the streets with explosives or attempted assassinations. To mitigate this risk, the Afgoye research team put the data collection work on hold on Wednesdays. Similarly, there
were security alerts warning of the high risk of al-Shabaab attacking major cities in Somalia, particularly in Kismayo. The researchers there were unable to visit some of the IDP sites, especially those sited outside the city and particularly in the Luglow (19 kms from the city) area as a result of these security threats.

Displaced communities in Kismayo consisted both of those who had arrived some time ago and those who had recently arrived. The newly displaced people were primarily settled outside the city, where it was difficult for them to come into town to participate in the study.

Some interlocutors in Afgoye had reservations about the focus groups. In addition, it was difficult to determine the number of participants who met the given criteria of gender, age and status as a returnee, an IDP or a member of the host community. The local fixer justified this challenge by citing the recent death of an elder before our data collection period; he had been accused of participating in a workshop that discussed national security issues. In addition, some key informants in Kismayo wanted to respond to interviews only if they were paid.

Finding returnees in Afgoye to participate in the study was also a challenge, since such people are intermingled with the locals and do not have a specific camp in the district.

Finally, the information that the South West officials in Afgoye had on durable solutions was limited. The ministries responsible for durable solutions work had no presence in the town and South West mostly focused on emerging issues in Afgoye. Moreover, Afgoye district commissioners change frequently, and the district officials had little information on durable solutions or relevant policies. Therefore, to get the South West perspective on durable solutions capabilities, the researchers interviewed officials in Baidoa over the phone.

3 Durable solutions capacities at federal member state level

This section analyses the capabilities of durable solution efforts in Jubaland and South West states, particularly in Kismayo and Afgoye. It looks specifically at the federal member states’ approaches to receiving IDPs and returnees, at government durable solution units and plans, the different actors contributing to the implementation of durable solutions plans, and at existing coordination between durable solutions units.

3.1 Approaches to receiving IDPs and returnees

Internally displaced persons and refugee returnees have been moving to Mogadishu and the cities and towns in the regional states for several years. According to most interviewees, the federal member states’ approaches to the reception of IDPs and returnees have been positive, despite the differences in their local contexts. In Kismayo, for instance, the regional state allocated four sections of the city to IDPs: Dalxiiska, Faanoole, Central and Galbeed. Each section
has several sub-sections; each sub-section has also several IDP sites, with each IDP site having a leader.

Apart from organising and designating a temporary place for IDPs, in 2015 Jubaland established the Jubaland Commission for Refugees and IDPs (JUCRI), whose mandate is to serve and protect the rights of IDPs and refugee returnees and to coordinate their needs with donors and international organisations. The Commission has been working on Jubaland’s planning and resource distribution to the IDPs and returnees. JUCRI’s headquarters is in Kismayo, and it has offices in Luuq, Doolow, Dhooble and Afmadow districts.³

The Jubaland Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs established an emergency rescue committee comprised of representatives from the host community’s youth, women, elders, religious scholars and the different sections of society. The committee was created to deal with drought-affected people by identifying their locations, evaluating their needs and connecting them with assistance offered by the host community and charitable organisations.⁴

Jubaland also allocated a new settlement close to Luglow – 19 km from Kismayo – for IDPs from the city. The Jubaland administration decided to relocate the IDP communities as a result of overcrowding in the IDP camps, making it difficult to manage the health and security concerns there.⁵ However, the Luglow site presented some challenges, particularly over safety and security, primarily because of its distance from the city centre.⁶ Unreliable transport links from Luglow to the city presented another challenge. The lack of other essential services such as health, education, the supply of water and access to electricity was presented as a further serious challenge to the suitability of Luglow for the relocation of returnees and IDPs.⁷

The Kismayo municipal authority also allocated a piece of land for the returnees, some of the IDPs, and the local community in Kismayo. With the help of some NGOs, houses were built for IDPs and returnees, as well as schools, markets, shops and halls in the vicinity of New Kismayo.⁸

An officer in the Afgoye district administration emphasised that the district was hosting thousands of IDPs, including those displaced from Laasanod district in Somaliland, after the Somaliland authorities reportedly evicted the residents of the town from southern Somalia. These IDPs currently live predominantly in camps, while returnees live independently within the local community. The officer noted that the administration arranges temporary land for the IDPs, guarantees their safety and security, and connects the aid agencies for assistance.

In Afgoye, Dollawe and Hawa Tako are the largest IDP neighbourhoods. However, there are

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³ Interview with a member of JUCRI, Kismayo, 29 August 2022.
⁴ Interview with the chair of the youth organisation in Kismayo district, 25 August 2022.
⁵ Interview with a durable solutions coordinator in Jubaland, Kismayo, 28 August 2022.
⁶ Interview with the chair of a local NGO in Kismayo, 25 August 2022.
⁸ Interview with the mayor and district commissioner of Kismayo, 28 August 2022.
constraints regarding the reception of IDPs and returnees in the district. This is a result of the local administration's lower capacity to deal with the displacement challenge as well as the unclear hierarchical structure that has resulted from the fragile security in the district.\textsuperscript{9}

The federal member states, and particularly the Jubaland administration in Kismayo, have played a crucial role in receiving and handling IDPs and returnee refugees. Their role is not just confined to providing protection and temporary (and permanent) settlements for the IDPs and returnees but also involves forming institutions to service their needs, such as JUCRI. However, the data collected for this study reveal a critical gap in housing IDP and returnee communities between the capital cities of the federal member states and the secondary cities and towns. This can be attributed to the federal member states' approach to concentrating more power in the regional capitals (Kismayo in Jubaland and Baidoa – interim capital – in South West) than to devolving authority and resources to secondary towns and districts. Another factor could be the concentration of aid projects and support in the regional capitals as a result of the proximity of top government officials, security facilities and the higher number of IDPs and returnees there.

\section*{3.2 Durable solution units and plans}

Although regional and municipal administrations took a positive approach to receiving IDPs and returnees, all the informants we interviewed stated that none of the municipal administrations had a durable solutions unit. However, the federal member states do have durable solutions units under the state Ministry of Planning or other durable solutions units closely related to ministries. For example, an interviewee from South West indicated that the federal member states mostly have durable solutions offices or units within their state planning ministries. South West has a durable solutions unit under its ministry of planning. It also has a contact person for the unit in Afgoye.\textsuperscript{10}

On the other hand, most of the interviewees in Jubaland had differing views on any specific unit, office or department working for durable solutions at the regional state level. Some stated that Jubaland's only ministry with a durable solutions office was the newly established Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management.

According to a durable solutions coordinator in Jubaland, the interior ministry, with the support of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), recruited contact persons for the Kismayo municipality, JUCRI and the Ministry of Planning to coordinate durable solutions issues in the state. Regardless, the critical point is that how regional durable solutions units function is unclear because of the several ministries involved in durable solutions matters and the disagreements among the ministries on which government institution has the jurisdiction to lead durable solutions.

\textsuperscript{9} Interview with a durable solutions project manager at an INGO in Afgoye, Mogadishu, 19 September 2022.

\textsuperscript{10} Interview with South West durable solutions unit contact person in Afgoye, Mogadishu, 4 September 2022.
An officer from the Federal Ministry of Planning contended that durable solutions work should be coordinated by the federal member state Ministry of Planning, which does not have an implementation role but coordinates the work with other relevant government institutions. In this regard, the durable solutions units and their mandate in Jubaland are not clear. This could be an area where the EU could provide support to advance and promote the effective coordination of durable solutions works.

The regional durable solutions units do not have autonomy from federal government line ministries, as most of those interviewed underlined. Nonetheless, some interviewees in Jubaland indicated that their durable solutions unit had semi-autonomy from the federal government. The Jubaland planning ministry’s official name is the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. It has a mandate to cooperate and work with international organisations. Our informants particularly emphasised that those organisations whose projects are confined only to Jubaland have nothing to do with the federal government and receive registration and approval letters directly from the Jubaland ministry of planning. Nevertheless, if the organisation operates beyond Jubaland, those interviewed acknowledged that it obtains registration from the federal government, which notifies the federal member states for approval and collaboration.

While acknowledging the existence of durable solutions units at the regional level, the interviewees all noted that the regional states had no regional durable solutions strategy, nor a plan parallel to that developed by the FGS in 2019. Instead, they adopted the national durable solutions strategy and plan in their local contexts to synchronise the FGS and regional state governance systems.11

There are several reasons why the regional governments do not have a regional-level durable solutions plan. In Jubaland, for instance, one of the reasons given was that the state was still new, and its institutions needed to grow in order to have the capacity to develop a durable solutions strategy. Another reason was that the key decision makers in the regional states had for the past two to three years been preoccupied with politics, including Jubaland and South West elections and federal indirect elections.12 The need for more budget and technical assistance was another reason regional states did not have a strategy or plan for durable solutions.13

While adopting the national durable solutions strategy, the regional states have coordinating structures among their ministries that work closely on durable solutions, as well as between the ministries and donor partners.14 The NGOs working on durable solutions have a coordination structure supported by the Danwadaag Consortium.15 Although the Danwadaag Consortium has

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11 Interview with a member of JUCRI, Kismayo, 29 August 2022.
12 Interview with the deputy director of a charitable organisation in Kismayo, 25 August 2022.
13 Interview with a durable solutions coordinator in Jubaland, Kismayo, 28 August 2022.
14 Ibid.
15 Danwadaag is a consortium of several organisations led by the IOM. The consortium members are Tethered Up, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Concern Worldwide (CWW), the Regional Durable
experienced some funding gaps, the coordination structure still exists, at the time of conducting
the study, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has taken the lead
in supporting the salaries and expenses of the workers in the coordination structure.\textsuperscript{16}

After the FGS established a durable solutions unit at the Ministry of Planning, Investment and
Economic Development to provide coordination for the key national and international
stakeholders on durable solutions, it became necessary to devolve the durable solutions
activities to the federal member states. Therefore, in collaboration with the regional planning
ministries, the federal Ministry of Planning has created regional durable solutions units and
worked collectively on durable solutions initiatives. However, the devolution of durable
solutions tasks to municipal administrations has never been accomplished, as the data reveal,
thanks to the concentration of authority in the Ministry’s regional durable solutions unit, which
has neither the capacity, the incentive nor the willingness to help establish specialised durable
solutions units within municipal offices. Local administrations are also under the Ministry of
Interior, which means that the regional planning ministries cannot directly deal with a portfolio
under the state Ministry of Interior. Accordingly, as an alternative, the regional durable solutions
unit has placed durable solutions contact persons in the municipal administrations.

Since the federal-level durable solutions unit has supported the establishment of the regional
durable solutions units under the federal member states’ ministries of planning, the authority
of the regional durable solutions units to work beyond the federal Ministry of Planning is limited.
Despite some regional units claiming partial autonomy from the federal durable solutions unit,
their authority to deal with large-scale projects is restricted. They seem only to have access to
coordinate and control small projects independently, which often deviates from the overall
coordination of durable solutions plans and tasks.

On the other hand, as most of the federal member states have only recently been established
(from 2013 onwards), their governance structure is still at a rudimentary stage, and the
availability of qualified human capital is limited. Further, Somalia’s decentralisation of the
governance system may take more time, as the federal member state presidents have shown a
desire to concentrate power in the capitals of the regional states. Therefore, adopting the
national strategy and plan for durable solutions in the local contexts of the regional states
appears to be an important undertaking if political support and commitment to decentralising
this durable solutions work are gained from the regional state leadership.

3.3 Actors contributing to the implementation of durable solutions plans

Since the national durable solutions strategy and plan is the only document used across the
country, those we interviewed said that the regional states, the local community and NGOs
could contribute to implementing the plan in various ways. For example, they noted that the
government could provide legally recognised entitlements to land ownership and security by
setting up police stations. It is worth mentioning that the allocation of land to IDPs and returnees in Afgoye costs more than in Baidoa because of Afgoye’s proximity to Mogadishu, which causes land prices to skyrocket.

The government could also coordinate the overall activities related to implementation at the district, state and federal levels. In addition, the local community could mobilise resources from business people and the rich, while NGOs could contribute to securing basic services, and economic and livelihood support for implementing the plan. Regarding policies, the national-level durable solutions strategy is to be implemented across all regional states.

Because of the various ways different actors could contribute to the implementation of the durable solutions strategy, the expectations are relatively good. Nevertheless, some weaknesses require to be addressed, particularly the provision of technical capacity building to the institutions developing durable solutions policies and to those that would implement these policies. There is a need for the payment of salary to the officials who technically support implementing the durable solutions strategy. Moreover, the officials who are supposed to work on the implementation of the policies need a greater understanding of these, and it is necessary to translate the policies into the Somali language. Other limitations include the rising cost of construction equipment and a lack of funding.

A key challenge in implementing the durable solutions strategy is finding pieces of land on which to permanently resettle IDPs and returnees. In some cases, where regional governments were willing to allocate land, they could not do so since land is one of the most controversial issues in Somalia. Tribes, families, and even individuals claim every piece of land either through inheritance from their forebears or by having bought it legally from previous governments. Where land is made available, NGO provision of resources according to their area of work, such as shelter, health, education and water can tremendously enhance the chances for effective implementation of the durable solutions strategy. However, weaknesses in the existing technical capacities and the lack of systematic salary payments to the skilled NGO employees are challenges for implementing the strategy.

### 3.4 Existing coordination between durable solutions units

The interviewees provided a variety of answers about the current coordination arrangements between the regional and federal institutions that run the durable solutions units. Some interviewees in Kismayo argued that there was no significant coordination between Jubaland...
and federal-level ministries managing the durable solutions units, as a result of the political
tensions between the federal government and Jubaland during former president Farmaajo’s
administration. However, others interviewed in Kismayo stated that coordination does exist
between the regional and federal-level durable solutions ministries.

The durable solutions unit within the federal Ministry of Planning and the different institutions
promoting durable solutions in Jubaland, such as the Jubaland ministry of planning, interior
ministry and JUCRI, coordinate durable solutions activities. However, the existing coordination
mechanism between the federal government and regional institutions in Kismayo is limited and
needs to be strengthened.23

On the other hand, there is effective coordination on durable solutions tasks for IDPs and
returnees between the durable solutions unit at the federal Ministry of Planning and the
Directorate of Durable Solutions and Urban Resilience within the South West ministry of
planning.24 A member of the durable solutions unit of the South West planning ministry said:

To unify durable solutions efforts for the IDPs and returnees, our directorate
and the durable solutions unit at the federal Ministry of Planning work in a
coordinated manner. The director of the durable solutions unit at the federal
Ministry of Planning or a representative from the unit attends our quarterly
technical coordination meeting for durable solutions activities in Baidoa.25

There is good coordination of durable solutions activities among the regional-level durable
solutions actors. For example, in Jubaland, two committees are working on durable solutions
coordination. The first was established to coordinate the ministries responsible for the
implementation of durable solutions activities. The committee meets once a month and consists
of the director-generals from 13 ministries that work as a technical team.26

The coordination structure is that we prepare the agenda and the
documentation during the monthly meeting. Each of the 13 ministries send its
agenda, which we organise in one template. We do checklists and coordinate
and control how the activities are going and the challenges. We do many follow-
ups.27

The second committee involves the ministries and the partners (donors). They meet quarterly
with the lead agency being UNHCR.28 Overall, the regional government coordinates the
organisations’ work and observes what they have done, what remains to be done and the
challenges they face. South West also has a quarterly technical working group, which comprises
vital government institutions that are members of durable solutions units, the UN, and

23 Interview with a member of JUCRI, Kismayo, 29 August 2022.
24 Interview with South West durable solutions unit officer, Baidoa, 10 September 2022.
25 Ibid.
26 Interview with a durable solutions coordinator in Jubaland, Kismayo, 28 August 2022.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
international and local NGOs. The group discusses the coordination of durable solutions for IDPs and returnees in South West.²⁹

In general, the existing coordination of durable solutions activities for IDPs and returnees has a three-layered structure. The upper level sits between the federal and regional level institutions: the specialised units for durable solutions at the federal Ministry of Planning and the regional ministries of planning. The intermediate level lies between the regional durable solutions unit at the regional ministries of planning and the line ministries, the UN, and international and local NGOs working in the regional state. The lower level of coordination occurs between the regional durable solutions unit and contact persons in the municipalities or towns beyond the regional state’s capitals.

4 NGOs and private sector involvement in durable solutions

This section examines the coordination mechanism between the federal member states and the implementing partners (both local and international) and the role of NGOs as well as that of the private sector in assisting IDPs, returnees and host communities.

4.1 Coordination of federal states and local and international NGOs

The federal durable solutions unit under the Ministry of Planning is responsible for the coordination of NGOs’ work at the federal level, while the federal member states are mandated to coordinate the local and international NGOs’ durable solutions operations in their states. Notably, the regional planning ministries are the leading coordinators with the authority to approve the projects. The regional planning ministry discusses with the local or international NGOs the kind of project they want to carry out, its duration and budget, and assigns it to the relevant ministries and clusters.

The regional planning ministries oversee the coordination and have the authority to monitor the implementation of the projects. The regional governments and the local and international NGOs coordinate through monthly, biannual and annual meetings.³⁰ There are also bi-weekly coordination forums or cluster systems, such as those on shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), livelihood, and protection, led by the regional administration, in which the government and the NGOs discuss what each NGO can find for the durable solutions activities in the state.³¹

In South West, for instance, the regional-level coordination is good, according to a durable solutions project manager in an international NGO who is based in Afgoye. As the NGOs receive funds for a project, the latter’s implementation depends on the support and collaboration of

²⁹ Interview with South West durable solutions unit officer, Baidoa, 10 September 2022.
³⁰ Interview with a senior officer in JUCRI, Kismayo, 26 August 2022.
³¹ Interview with a senior officer in the South West Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, Baidoa, 4 September 2022.
district or state-level authorities. The authorities’ coordination starts from the project’s opening event; they map the stakeholders with the NGOs and select a local technical working group. Further, the regional or district administrations provide the legal framework and guidance and approval for the projects to run effectively.

The state-level planning ministries facilitate the relationship between the NGOs and the relevant ministries for their area of work. The durable solutions unit at the regional planning ministries plays a vital role in connecting NGOs and the rest of the regional government institutions. The security situation in Afgoye has negatively affected the coordination and implementation of durable solutions projects. One of the INGO staff we interviewed stated that, despite having regular staff and offices in Baidoa, they could not operate directly in Afgoye because of the security threats. As an alternative, they partner with local NGOs that help them implement the projects in the district. This means they transfer the security risk to local NGOs.

The regional governments appear to effectively coordinate the NGOs’ work in their state, despite the different levels of coordination. The barriers to regional cooperation arise within the government. That is to say, it would be possible for federal member state ministries to argue over which of them has the mandate or jurisdiction in a specific area of work with the NGOs, because every ministry strives to manage and get involved in externally funded projects. Another barrier is that some government institutions or officials might in some cases obstruct NGOs’ operations for personal gain. The impediments to district coordination beyond the regional capitals emerge from the security threats, which make coordination less effective. In addition, the capacity of the administration to coordinate the NGOs’ work is weak and needs to be improved.

4.2 Role of NGOs in assisting IDPs, returnees and host communities

The local, national and international NGOs carry out various projects to assist IDPs, returnees and host communities in the federal member states of Somalia. Their supporting operations depend on their specific mandates. Some NGOs work in food, shelter, health, education and WASH, while others work on livelihood projects. In Kismayo, for instance, the NGOs provide humanitarian assistance during emergencies, particularly water tracking, shelters and food vouchers. As a result of the 2022 drought, an NGO provided a food voucher of $75 for each family. Another NGO builds police posts and free schools and erects street lights. Earlier some NGOs constructed the New Kismayo neighbourhood on the outskirts of the town for IDPs, returnees and some of the host community. The neighbourhood has an excellent urban plan and a hospital with complementary services for residents. A member of a local NGO in Kismayo said:

We were the first organisation that voluntarily helped IDPs in the New Kismayo.
We distributed 100 plastic bags, blankets and kitchen utensils to 100 families.

32 Interview with a member of JUCRI, Kismayo, 29 August 2022.
33 Interview with an international NGO officer in Kismayo, 29 August 2022.
34 Interview with a durable solutions coordinator in Jubaland, Kismayo, 28 August 2022.
Since we were familiar with the local community, we organised the local associations to collect clothes and utensils from the community. Also, we provided advocacy to the internally displaced communities.\(^{35}\)

Some of the IDP community members we interviewed in Kismayo said they had received a variety of aid from the NGOs. For example, a woman from the IDP community acknowledged that some of the international NGOs provided food assistance to them and previously used to deliver health care, education facilities and shelter. However, the NGOs have shifted into the new camps where the newly arrived displaced communities live. There are complaints from IDP communities regarding assistance distribution. For instance, a male interviewee stated that some NGOs give cash vouchers to the IDPs, but only certain people, such as the camp leader and his or her close associates, receive the cash. Another male interviewee said that people are registered for food vouchers as a single person, and later other family members join the family; the person gets only the food parcel as a single person, which is not enough for an entire family. In Afgoye, most of the IDPs said they received cash vouchers from the NGOs, which are not regular and are not for a fixed amount. A considerable number of IDPs who participated in the FGDs stated that the NGOs provided food vouchers. However, the average amount received by each family was $65.\(^{36}\)

Those who had returned to Kismayo with the support of UN agencies received six-month food and cash vouchers. In addition, the government offered land, while the NGOs covered the cost of building houses with one or two rooms, a veranda and a toilet for each family.\(^{37}\) On the other hand, returnees in Afgoye did not receive any assistance from NGOs, as a participant in one of the FGDs stated, and the rest echoed.\(^{38}\)

In Afgoye, NGOs distribute cash vouchers for the IDPs and the poor community. However, most of the cash vouchers are taken by the district authorities and their close associates.\(^{39}\)

Following the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, many of the host communities have been dependent on money sent by their relatives abroad. Some poor families do not receive remittance money. These low-income, urban poor families within the host community have needs similar to those of the IDPs and returnees but do not receive the same attention that NGOs pay to the displaced communities. A female interviewee stated that 40% of the host community in Kismayo lives in challenging conditions similar to or worse than those experienced by the IDPs and returnees.\(^{40}\) A human resources officer from one of the universities in Kismayo also noted that the affected host community gets less assistance from the NGOs than from local

\(^{35}\) Interview with the chair of a local NGO in Kismayo, 25 August 2022.
\(^{36}\) A male participant in an FGD held in Kismayo, 22 August 2022.
\(^{37}\) A male participant in an FGD held in Kismayo, 22 August 2022.
\(^{38}\) A female participant in an FGD held in Afgoye, 28 August 2022.
\(^{39}\) A female participant in an FGD held in Afgoye, 28 August 2022.
\(^{40}\) Interview with the women’s association chair of Kismayo district, 28 August 2022.
businesspeople.

Notwithstanding the contentions above, another interviewee stated that the NGOs support the host community by distributing cash vouchers. There is an on-and-off project that has registered 13,000 people from the host community and among IDPs, which has been going on for the past three years. The Jubaland interior ministry, district administration, and sections and sub-sections of the district administration are responsible for the distribution of cash vouchers for the host community. Each voucher holder from the host community receives various monthly packages worth from $50 to $90 and sometimes receives food in exchange for money. The previous project has ended. A current ongoing project registered only 3,000 people as a result of its limited funding.\footnote{Interview with the youth association chair of Kismayo district, 25 August 2022.}

Furthermore, some NGOs support the host community in getting access to health services. For instance, the Kismayo General Hospital is under the management of the International Committee of the Red Cross. NGOs assist with education services for the host community’s children.\footnote{Interview with the deputy director at a charitable organisation in Kismayo, 25 August 2022.}

NGOs have been implementing different humanitarian and development operations to support IDPs and returnees in the regional states for years. The findings of this study reveal that NGOs have been paying more attention to the recently arrived IDPs and returnees than to those who had previously been displaced. One can contend that the newly displaced people are in a tougher situation than the rest. However, ultimately, they are all displacement-affected people and require holistic assistance. A further issue that came out of the data is that some of the affected host communities are occasionally in a more difficult situation than the displaced communities and also need close attention. Some of the NGOs in Afgoye primarily provide cash vouchers rather than food distribution, which may be a result of the security threats in the district.

\section*{4.3 Role of the private sector in assisting IDPs, returnees, and host communities}

Even though the primary objective of the private sector is to generate profits, it is expected to take responsibility for contributing to the wellbeing of society: first, to prevent damage to society when accruing business profits; and second, to make employment opportunities fair and equal for the whole of society.\footnote{Interview with an admin officer in a private company in Kismayo, 26 August 2022.} As droughts and other human-made calamities have been recurring in Somalia for years, the private sector, with the local community, was the first to respond to the emergency needs of the displaced communities, before any other assistance was provided to them. They engage with the people displaced during emergencies by delivering water trucks and distributing food and plastic tarpaulins to remote villages.\footnote{Interview with the deputy director of a charitable organisation in Kismayo, 25 August 2022.}

Some government officials we interviewed stated that the private sector assists the local population – particularly the IDPs and returnees – more than does the government. This is a sign of most of the regional governments’ inadequate revenue, and the federal government – which
also depends heavily on donor money – provides budgetary support to some federal member states. Despite the private sector’s engagement with displaced and returnee populations as a deliverer of different necessities, its support is confined to emergencies. The local community and civil society organisations occasionally urge it to donate money and in-kind support to displaced communities during such times.\(^45\)

On the other hand, some interviewees stated that the private sector engaged with displaced and returnee populations by donating hundreds of thousands of US dollars, particularly to malnourished children and their mothers and to those in Afgoye who were forcibly evicted from Laasanod. In addition, during Eid in the holy month of Ramadan, the private sector arranges a programme called ‘Afurin’, where it provides food and money to displaced people. And one private company has reportedly provided some three to five ambulances to the Kismayo General Hospital.

In Kismayo, the Jubaland Chamber of Commerce and Industry has effectively coordinated the private sector during emergencies. However, as the former chair of the Chamber was killed in a suicide attack, its dynamic coordination has become restricted.\(^46\) The water supply in Kismayo and the surrounding villages is insufficient. The scourge of water scarcity touches the displacement-affected communities more profoundly than the host community. Although the water supply companies in the city are profit-oriented, they deliver free water tankers on Fridays to the areas where IDPs and returnees reside.\(^47\)

NGOs run programmes in which cash vouchers are distributed to displaced communities in Kismayo and Afgoye. An international aid agency staff member we interviewed said that the NGOs work closely with the private sector as an implementing partner. For example, NGOs ask local private banks to manage and transfer cash to the beneficiaries. As a result, private companies such as Dahabshiil Bank, Amal Bank and Somtel have served as a channel to facilitate the transfer of the cash vouchers deposited by NGOs to the IDPs, returnees and affected host communities.

In addition, there has been a programme for the economic empowerment of displaced communities, in which NGOs provided individuals and groups with loans to start their own businesses. The aid agencies and the private local banks collaborated on the amount of money each individual or group could withdraw and on the loan amount they could obtain.\(^48\) For implementing partners, the NGOs create a public–private partnership between the government and the private sector. The government is responsible for providing public goods and services to the people but, thanks to its limited capacity, it was essential to partner with the private sector. Therefore, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), for instance, has commissioned private companies to carry out 50% of the implementation of a water supply project in Luglow and the

\(^{45}\) Interview with the chair of the youth organisation in Kismayo district, 25 August 2022.
\(^{46}\) Interview with a durable solutions coordinator in Jubaland, Kismayo, 28 August 2022.
\(^{47}\) Interview with an admin officer in a private company in Kismayo, 26 August 2022.
\(^{48}\) Interview with an international NGO durable solutions project manager in Afgoye, Mogadishu, 19 September 2022.
surrounding area with the rest to be done by the regional government.\textsuperscript{49}

The interviewees gave various answers about the private sector’s employment of displaced communities. Some returnees and IDPs have more skills than the host community, and their chance to access job opportunities in the private sector is high. For example, barber shops, construction companies, electric companies, schools and universities hire people from among the IDPs and returnees, while some other IDPs are domestic workers. On the other hand, the private sector does not have an employment policy giving special consideration to displaced communities. Moreover, according to the World Bank, Somalia’s overall unemployment rate has been high for decades and has increased exponentially over the past couple of years.\textsuperscript{50} The government authority is engaging the private sector to play a crucial role in a way that addresses the displacement crisis and builds a lasting solution to displacements.

## 5 Experiences of IDPs, returnees and host communities

This section discusses the experiences of IDPs and returnees, their perceptions of the host community, the host community’s perceptions of IDPs and returnees, the benefits IDPs and returnees bring to the host community, and the kind of assistance IDPs and returnees receive. The section also delves into access to resources and job opportunities, the availability of special programmes for vulnerable people, challenges in social services such as education and healthcare, challenges in housing, land and property, and environmental challenges.

### 5.1 IDPs’ experiences

Internal displacement has been increasing as a result of Somalia’s frequent droughts, climate shocks and security concerns. Because of the droughts, clan conflicts and the government’s battle with al-Shabaab, a large number of people have been forced to flee their homes in Balad-Amin, Mareerey, Toratorow, Sabiib Aw dheegle Muurtiile, Baruur, Leego, Jamaame, Afmadow and Sablaale villages and districts. These IDPs found refuge in camps in Afgoye. For the same reasons, a sizable number of people have also fled from Bu’aale, Turdho, Kansuuma, Badhaadhe, Afmadow, Jilib, Goobweyn, Yoontooy and Sablaale villages and districts to seek refuge in Kismayo. Droughts have become more frequent in recent seasons, resulting in the loss of an enormous number of livestock. Droughts have also affected more resilient riverine areas, such as Afgoye, where the river has totally dried up. Food shortages caused by failed harvests have wreaked havoc on the lives of thousands of people, and the situation became worse when the farmers

\textsuperscript{49} Interview with an international NGO officer in Kismayo, 29 August 2022.

were forced to become beggars.\textsuperscript{51}

The drought is dangerous, but security concerns are inducing displaced people to remain in the camps. A former farmer who now lives in an IDP camp in Afgoye said that, even if it starts to rain soon, he will not go to his farm because doing so would be the same as choosing to die. The speaker continued:

There is a bad administration where we came from. We were farmers, and we were forced to displace (by al-Shabaab). They used to rob us. Imagine, when we grow our farm and after seasons of hard work, we produce 25 bags, for instance. They ask us to divide the yield into three sections. They take one section; they ask us to re-cultivate the farm with the second portion, and they tell you to keep and use the third portion. No matter what we produce and how much it is, we have to fulfil this formula. Even if we don’t produce anything, there is a $5 rent to pay for al-Shabaab. Zakka [annual payment] is also above this exploitation. Every man was forced to flee from there. I can’t go back there. It is like going back to my graveyard. As long as they are there, I will struggle and stay here as an IDP.\textsuperscript{52}

Many farmers stopped farming because of al-Shabaab’s brutal governance. They ask for money when the farm is cultivated, when the crop is harvested, and when it is sold, and they require zakka in addition. These extra costs have discouraged agricultural activities and increased the number of IDPs. One local government official stated that they always inform the federal government that the insecurity is creating new displacements.\textsuperscript{53} Displaced people also started flocking to Kismayo when farmers in that region couldn’t buy and install pumps to irrigate their farms. As a result, the city became overwhelmed with displaced persons.\textsuperscript{54}

In addition, people flee from their homes for lack of necessary and basic services but the government can’t liberate such localities from al-Shabaab. More people would be able to satisfy their basic needs without abandoning their houses, would make a livelihood and would not move to urban cities if the aid itself were deployed to the nomadic people in the places they visit, which is not possible because of the insecurity.\textsuperscript{55}

The political rift between the federal government and the Jubaland administration in the past few years has negatively contributed to IDPs’ experiences and their access to services. At the peak of the political rift, the FGS ordered international organisations not to set foot in Jubaland and even banned commercial flights to Kismayo. Jubaland therefore entered an economic crisis resulting from the FGS’s approach to punishing the administration.\textsuperscript{56} Even middle-class people

\textsuperscript{51} Interview with a local NGO, Mogadishu, 29 August 2022.
\textsuperscript{52} Interview with an IDP member, Afgoye, 23 August 2022.
\textsuperscript{53} Interview with an official from the Southwest Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, Baidoa, 4 September 2022.
\textsuperscript{54} Interview with durable solutions coordinator in Jubaland, Kismayo, 28 August 2022.
\textsuperscript{55} Interview with a local NGO, Mogadishu, 29 August 2022.
\textsuperscript{56} Interview with durable solutions coordinator in Jubaland, Kismayo, 28 August 2022.
could not travel to Mogadishu for medical treatment.

Some interviewees stated that a conspiracy between the camp leaders or ‘gatekeepers’ and some of the nomadic people may have contributed to the IDPs’ exodus. The gatekeepers are believed to have established camps for the poorer families in the host community and registered them as IDPs so that they can receive aid on their behalf. Even though some poorer families might live in the IDP camps, this is not very common. The number of forcibly displaced people outnumbers any fictitious IDPs.

This presumption may be supported by the welcoming traditions of Somali families. Every time a family or individual IDP moves into a new camp, they automatically inform their neighbours and relatives about the situation there. Families place more trust in their relatives and friends than in the government or in the organisations that provide aid. As a result, IDPs now have better and simpler methods for integrating and sharing resources. This benefit is not normally enjoyed by returnees, since the latter are often not limited to camps and are scattered, particularly in Afgoye.

5.2 Returnees’ experiences

Returned Somalis from Kenya's refugee camps make up a sizeable portion of the population in Kismayo. The town’s proximity to the Kenyan border has facilitated the relocation of many voluntary returnees from the Dhagaxley and Xagardheer (Dadaab) refugee camps in Kenya. The largest arrival of returnees, however, began with the assistance of UN organisations after the Kenyan government announced the closure of the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps.\(^{57}\) They were provided with financial assistance for transportation and received $200 to $300 for resettlement.\(^{58}\)

After spending decades stranded in those refugee camps, voluntary returnees were drawn to Somalia by its relatively improved security as well as by better job opportunities. The hope for a more stable and prosperous Somalia also motivated the voluntary returnees from Kenya, Uganda and Libya who now reside in Afgoye. Nevertheless, their dream was shattered by the realities on the ground. A returnee from Libya puts it this way:

I was indeed saved from a brutal prison, but I still have the idea of leaving this country. Of course, I don’t want to go through that perilous migration route again, but leaving here is a must. There is no justice in this country. You might see people who are taking your belongings and you cannot do anything about it. I yearn for freedom and justice. Lacking them is why I risked my life in the first place and, still, the challenges have even grown much worse. If things go better, we will of course stay in our country.

Nevertheless, the majority of those returnees in Afgoye from Yemen were dragged from their

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\(^{58}\) FGD participant, Kismayo, 22 August 2022.
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In Kismayo and Afgoye

life in Al Qaras and Al Basatin refugee camps after war ripped that country apart. In late 2014, Somali refugees in Yemen started their journey of coming back to Somalia – the country they had fled from 1991 onwards for the same reason.

Returnees who had previously lived (before they fled) in both Kismayo and Afgoye experienced rapid (re)integration, whereas others encountered social impediments upon their return. It took them several months to interact with the community, which was suspicious of the returnees and recognised them as diaspora, assuming them to be wealthier. Even though reuniting with old friends and family members seemed wonderful to local returnees, it was grossly inadequate in compensating for the psychological costs of burdening the family they used to send money to and the neighbours to whom they had pledged to have a better life on their own.

Many of the returnees suffered severe depression, even though their host community and their relatives welcomed them equally. The absence of local social services, and the existence of cultural differences have led to psychological consequences. Three returned citizens explained to us that they were unable to leave their homes as a result of feelings of failure, shame and a lack of belonging.59 They reported having been seriously damaged by this post-return period, where a refugee camp feels preferable to their own country. They remained indoors since they didn’t want to be subjected to pressure from relatives to integrate, which they felt was not sympathetic.

The returnees’ situation is more challenging than the IDPs’. They face curriculum challenges in terms of education. Cultural differences are also there. The returnees have also adopted formal refugee camps where they are registered and lived strictly. They wonder every time they see the IDPs moving from one camp to the other. The free movement has ached them.60

5. 3 Perception of IDPs and returnees towards the host community

IDPs and returnees who participated in this study stated that they had had a good relationship with the host community and were welcomed warmly when they first arrived. Nevertheless, when asked about the challenges they were experiencing in their new homes and neighbourhoods, they explicitly stated that the host community was now causing them harm in some way or another.

IDPs (and some returnees) are frequently evicted from their camps when the value of the land rises. Their lives are disturbed by the constant switching between camps and the insecurity of land tenure. They do, however, generally feel safe in the community, as there are few armed groups raping women and girls in their vulnerable shelters. Nevertheless, some in the host community hold a skewed perception of IDP children as being violent.61

IDPs and returnees believe that the host community has taken advantage of them because they

59 Two females from Yemen and one male returnee from Libya living in Afgoye.
60 Interview with an NGO senior officer in Mogadishu, 19 September 2022.
61 Interview with an NGO officer, Mogadishu, 29 August 2022.
have no other means of support and utilise every opportunity that comes their way to sustain their lives. They are assaulted and occasionally accused of theft and misconduct, which causes them to lose the money they had earned through manual labour. IDPs and returnees have integrated somewhat with the host community in terms of their shared religious beliefs and intra-marriage social customs.

5.4 Perception of the host community towards IDPs and returnees

With the arrival of IDPs and returnees, the host community's quality of life has been negatively affected. The onus of supporting the former has fallen on the host community as a whole, since the regional governments have not provided IDPs and returnees with the adequate and immediate support they need. IDPs and returnees sharing their meagre means of support and belongings with the host community has pushed their lives dangerously close to the brink of poverty.

Not only do close host-community family members share an unfavourable opinion of IDPs and returnees, so do other individuals in the community. The general discomfort that the arrival of IDPs and returnees has caused to the locals is widely lamented. For instance, rents have increased while the pay for manual labour has drastically decreased. Given the steadily rising inflation of food and oil prices over the past few years, both Afgoye – where a large number of low-skilled labourers live and work – and Mogadishu have seen lower wages and salaries.

The cost of living went up. For example, 1 kg of rice used to be around 10,000 Somali Shillings (slightly less than $0.5), but now it is more than 30,000 Somali Shillings (more than $1). Apart from the high cost of living, the IDPs came at a time when the river ran dry and droughts hit the Lower Shabelle region.

In Kismayo, the host community was concerned about how the employment market was being dominated by returnees, primarily from Kenya, whose fluency in English allowed them to outperform the locals and be hired by NGOs.

The host community views unfairness in the process in that IDP and returnees are favoured for cash and in-kind assistance, while, on the other hand, they have taken over land and jobs, and caused price surges in the goods market. The JUCRI officer in Kismayo acknowledges the rift between the two groups but stated that the perception of the host community towards the displaced is becoming positive.

After long-term orientation on the IDPs and returnees, the host community now sees the presence of IDPs and returnees in this area as normal. However, in the previous era or sometimes more recently, some host communities viewed the IDPs and returnees as prioritised over the host community. They saw that people who are not from the immediate environment are sharing their resources and the funds they are intended [i.e., receive] for the NGOs.

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62 FGD participant, Afgoye, 23 August 2022.
5.5 Benefits of IDPs and returnees to the host community

The presence of IDPs and returnees inevitably ensures that the host community's small businesses and service providers benefit from them. The towns where IDPs and returnees reside saw an upsurge in population, which was also reflected favourably in the growth of labour and in their minimal purchasing power, which in turn helped the expansion of small businesses. However, thanks to Somalia's lack of a minimum wage policy, the host community takes advantage of the oversupply of labour by paying workers less than the market rate and occasionally by giving them food in place of money.

Host communities have learned skills from the returnees, who gained such skills and knowledge through their foreign exposure. They have taught skills like cooking and ‘Do It Yourself’ (DIY) for things like soap and shampoo making. Host communities have used these skills and made a living out of them. Host communities also appreciate the association of IDPs and returnees with the durable solutions programmes of land and educational services. A father in Kismayo stated that his children go to a school built for the IDPs and returnees. The host community has also benefited directly from the IDPs and returnees who have shared aid with them and indirectly by buying cheap goods from the markets.

5.6 The kind of assistance IDPs and returnees receive

IDPs and returnees receive aid from international and local NGOs. Cash vouchers are the most prevalent form of aid. Interviewees informed us that the NGOs use vouchers to avoid the corruption that may affect their beneficiaries. However, the cash voucher system has become corrupt and gatekeepers take their portion of money from the beneficiary in a pre-agreed forced consent. If the beneficiaries fail to pay the gatekeeper the pre-agreed amount of money out of their cash vouchers, the former will lose the card, which means losing everything. Cash vouchers range from $20 to $100 and may be received either monthly or quarterly.

Food parcels are the second common form of assistance received by IDPs and returnees. Food rations are reportedly designed for a single person and the majority of large families are left with insufficient food. School kits, WASH and medical assistance are among other types of assistance. Another rather modern technique about which the IDPs and returnees talked warmly was the long-term investment support they received, such as learning new skills in tailoring, electricity and handcrafts. These skills are provided by the Social-life and Agricultural Development Organisation (SADO) in Kismayo and the Elman Peace & Human Rights Centre in Afgoye.

Returnees are less likely to receive aid than the host community, particularly in Afgoye, as they don't reside in any specific camp and are dispersed to the town, causing them to be overlooked. IDPs and returnees asserted that none of the aid or assistance they received was regular. However, they do not simply rely on aid but actively engage in markets where, to some extent however, they receive an unequal share of aid (and other) resources.

63 Interview with local NGO, Kismayo, 25 August 2022.
5.7 Unequal access to aid (and other) resources

According to informants, the IDPs and returnees do not receive the majority of food and aid resources. The host community gets the lion's share because of its close ties to the gatekeepers or camp leaders. According to an NGO worker, members of the host community occasionally declare themselves to be IDPs or a group of returnees in order to qualify for aid. In times of crisis and need, IDPs and returnees do not have an equal share of resources with the host community. While the former drink contaminated water or have limited access to clean water, the host community has access to piped water.\(^{64}\)

Water is the major source of conflict in Somalia. In times of drought, a water committee often distributes water in plastic water storage vessels in the camps. It is difficult to maintain absolute justice in distribution. Sometimes, the people in charge might distribute an unfair ratio to some of the beneficiaries or – worse – provide water to beneficiaries outside the camps.\(^{65}\)

An IDP mother in Afgoye told the researchers that a host community woman is given priority over her. She reasoned that this was a result of familial and town companionship ties. And if the services are insufficient, only the host community can get them.\(^{66}\) Another IDP in Kismayo echoed this view, saying that harassment and discrimination started in the first days after they had arrived in the city as an IDP, but that later they integrated with the local society and established a brotherly connection.\(^{67}\)

It is important to note that speaking to IDPs and returnees in South West and Jubaland states has also revealed inequality between the two groups. Returnees in Afgoye receive neither a proper welcome nor ongoing support from the government or NGOs, while IDPs are the focus of everyone’s attention. In contrast, the IDPs in Kismayo do not have the same access to opportunities and resources as the returnees, who are housed in the neighbourhood of New Kismayo and receive services and shelter that are generally better than those provided to the IDPs.

IDPs and returnees face huge inconvenience in getting funds or capital to start a new business and in borrowing a small amount of money to survive and repay. Their lack of physical property hinders the process of becoming self-reliant and landing a job in the labour market.

5.8 Job opportunities

The main obstacle to the host community’s efforts to integrate the IDPs and returnees is the lack of employment opportunities. Since SADO in Kismayo and Elman Peace in Afgoye started injecting trained and skilled human capital into the market, the job opportunities for IDPs and returnees have improved. Sometimes, candidates with training certificates are preferred over locals who have no prior technical training. Electrical, beauty salon, tailoring, henna tattooing,

\(^{64}\) Interview with NGO officer, Kismayo, 24 August 2022.  
\(^{65}\) Interview with a local NGO, Mogadishu, 29 August 2022.  
\(^{66}\) FGD participant, Afgoye, 23 August 2022.  
\(^{67}\) FGD participant, Kismayo, 21 August 2022.
textile dying and cooking are the technical skills taught to IDPs and returnees.

Additional skills and roles that IDPs and returnees employ to support themselves without the aid of NGOs include those of carpenter, butcher, tuk tuk or bajaj driver, hand carter, construction engineer, welder, porter, mason and farm worker. Women in particular contribute significantly to the financial stability of their families by working in salons, laundromats, construction and housekeeping, and by selling samosas and bajiya in handcarts outside their makeshift houses, as well as in markets. Others support themselves by working as traders between agricultural growers and the markets. They buy vegetables and fruits from the farmers and sell them in the markets and the IDP camps.

In addition to the employment barrier, the smaller percentage of IDPs and returnees who are employed face job insecurity. Their jobs are often unstable. Many people's lives have been blighted by the river drying up after the droughts, and thousands of workers who had been employed in agricultural cultivation, maintenance, harvesting and fruit picking have lost their jobs as a result.

The value of the IDPs' and returnees' hard-earned money has also decreased thanks to inflation. The tuk tuk/bajaj drivers have been severely affected by the oil price increases because they had to pay their owners back while also keeping up with the rising prices of other commodities with stagnant earnings. In this specific case, Kismayo's construction sites have dwindled as a result of the skyrocketing cost of imported cement, which has resulted in hundreds of jobless people.

Furthermore, employers don’t always abide by the rules on payment. As a result of IDPs and returnees negligence and sometimes poor performance, IDPs and returnees might receive less money than was originally agreed upon; occasionally they might even lose the entire sum. Nepotism is also in place; it is difficult to get hired even for daily wage jobs such as construction without support from some form of blood relation.

5.9 Special programmes for vulnerable people

Vulnerable people among the IDPs and returnees, such as those with disabilities, the elderly, children, single mothers and orphans are among the worst off. Although priority is given to vulnerable populations in some projects, they are frequently outranked by relatively affluent and healthy people.

However, NGOs offer special programmes and protection against gender-based violence and child marriage for the most vulnerable groups, as well as food and cash assistance. Furthermore, some organisations provide cash vouchers to IDP and returnee mothers that last for about two years, during the breastfeeding period. They also provide women-friendly amenities like

68 They drive a tuk tuk for the host community and send a specified amount of dollars to the owner each day while keeping the rest.
69 A spicy afternoon snack made of seasoned scrambled beans often served with green chili pepper.
70 Interview with Afgoye district official, 29 August 2022.
71 FGD participant in Kismayo, 22 August 2022.
breastfeeding rooms in hospitals and girls-only seating areas in schools.  

Private organisations also help vulnerable people, with religious leaders typically taking the lead, especially around Eid. For orphans, a few special programmes provide free boarding school education.

5.10 Challenges to social services — education and health services

For IDPs and returnees, educational services are an expensive commodity. Some primary schools have been set up by NGOs for the children of the displaced community, but they are not all equally accessible. Some parents purposefully choose to keep their children out of school because they rely on them to provide their family with food and water, while other parents are unaware that free schools are available for their children. Parents who would otherwise send their children to school are unable to buy uniforms. Free schools could change their lives, and some would argue that getting uniforms shouldn’t be too difficult. However, families prioritise food and the monthly fee for the Quranic Madrasa over sending their children to primary schools.

Beder and Barwaqo are public schools in Kismayo but returnees from Kenya have complained about their accessibility and the quality of their teaching. Both Kacaanka and Dugsi Sare Afgoye schools are free and teach up to the standard eight classes in Afgoye. However, these two schools are insufficient for the number of school-age children and their graduates are not guaranteed to continue their education in paid secondary schools.

Mother and child health services (MCHs) are primarily provided by MCH centres and publicly funded hospitals that IDPs and returnees share with host communities — but not equitably. MCHs only provide emergency services, whereas serious health cases, such as mothers requiring caesarean sections and patients who are severely ill have to be transferred to more capable hospitals, which at the very least requires expensive transportation to the public hospitals in major cities such as Mogadishu and Kismayo, if not transfer to more expensive privately owned hospitals. Returnees from Yemen interviewed for this study yearn for the education and health care they received in refugee camps.

5.11 Housing, land and property challenges

IDPs in Afgoye do not live in one place permanently. They live on land plots owned by individuals and are settled there in exchange for a portion of the aid they receive. This is given to the camp leader, who will share it with the landlord. This is especially difficult, because landlords tend to buy land as its value rises, causing IDPs to move constantly. IDPs are housed in public or government-owned facilities. When it comes to returnees in Afgoye, they all live in rentals.

In the Luglow settlement in Kismayo, there are obstacles to the acquisition of land. Luglow is some 19 km from the city of Kismayo. Despite having land and its title deeds, many beneficiaries

72 Interview with INGO Durable Solutions officer, Mogadishu, 19 September 2022.
73 Interview with a private company official, Kismayo, 24 August 2022.
live in rentals or with relatives in Kismayo because life there has become difficult due to the scarcity of social services. In contrast, the housing development in the ‘New Kismayo’ neighbourhood has been completely integrated into the community and has become the sixth neighbourhood in Kismayo. It was built for and given to returnees and IDPs (70%) and poorer host community members (30%) in Kismayo. Social services like schools, hospitals and markets have also been constructed for them there.

5.12 Environmental issues and climate change

Deforestation has increased, partly as a result of the influx of IDPs and returnees. The extent of poor sanitation and hygiene in the slums and clustered IDP settlements is typically getting worse in metropolitan areas. The renovation of IDP camps has resulted in tree cutting, and IDPs have also felled more trees to construct improvised housing in the camps. Although plastic makeshifts have been introduced as an alternative to wooden makeshifts, the problem of deforestation still exists.74

Environmental safety regulations have been established, such as a ban on cutting trees for charcoal export. Additionally, to collect trash from the slums where IDPs reside, the government has partnered with a local business. Afgoye district garbage collection is part of an employment initiative launched by an aid organisation to improve the district’s sanitation and preserve the health and wellbeing of its residents. Other initiatives have persisted, and the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) – previously the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) – has donated thousands of trees for planting in Kismayo. However, because the IDPs are unable to water the new plants, the donations have instead been given to the host community.75

The lack of land ownership among IDPs leaves them with little incentive to protect the environment. The majority of them also lack access to toilets, leaving them with no choice but to foul the environment.76 Diseases have been spreading among city and rural residents as a result of this pollution.77 An official contended that building toilets won’t resolve the issue, however, because, as a result of being adapted to nomadic life, most IDPs choose to use the outdoors instead. An NGO officer in a Mogadishu-based organisation that works in the region stated that:

The worst thing that the host community suffers from the IDPs is poor hygiene. Most of the IDPs are pastoralists and semi-pastoralists who do not use washrooms. Even when they can get washrooms in their camps, they, and their children, prefer to use them outside.78

It is critical to increase awareness of WASH initiatives among IDPs, returnees and the host community. In particular, IDPs with nomadic backgrounds tend to have no concern for pollution.

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74 Interview with Kismayo mayor, 28 August 2022.
75 Interview with a JUCRI Programme Manager, Kismayo, 29 August 2022.
76 Interview with local NGO officer, Kismayo, 25 August 2022.
77 Interview with an official from the Jubaland ministry of planning, Kismayo, 26 August 2022.
78 Interview with an NGO officer, Mogadishu, 29 August 2022.
and contribute to polluting the city by living in slums, discarding plastic products, and cutting down trees.

5.13 Long-term plans for IDPs and returnees

The IDPs displaced by conflict and drought may prefer to stay in the IDP camps for two reasons. First, because a conflict persists in their local villages, or their livestock has been killed and farms destroyed by drought and/or floods. Second, because there are opportunities for their children to attend schools and for them to receive some rudimentary social services.

On the other hand, those who have returned to Afgoye from Yemen prefer to go back to Yemen and resume their relatively better life there. However, returnees from Kenya, who are predominantly based in Kismayo, are also happy to stay in Kismayo. Many of those we interviewed stated that they enjoy freedom in Kismayo, are not restricted to a single camp, and have taken advantage of their situation and established businesses and other jobs in the city. Despite this optimism, they are still discouraged by the security situation in the country and admit that they don’t get the level of education and healthcare in Kismayo that they had in the refugee camps in Kenya.

6 Challenges NGOs face in supporting IDPs and returnees

This section assesses the challenges NGOs face in supporting IDPs and returnees. It analyses particularly the challenges in coordination, funding, security, environmental shocks, corruption, housing, land and property rights, inflation and integration.

6.1 Coordination

There is no durable solutions office operating in the Afgoye district. The Southwest Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management has only a contact person working there, although the officer resides in Mogadishu for security reasons. Unlike his counterpart in Baidoa, the state’s interim capital, the district commissioner of Afgoye does not have a full mandate to coordinate durable solutions at the local level. However, as the highest authority in the district, coordination with this official is unavoidable. The difficulty is that the Afgoye district commissioners are constantly sacked, and it takes months to follow up with the new commissioner and collaborate on ongoing projects. A certain NGO worker reported that they had worked with six district commissioners since the durable solutions work began in Afgoye.

Every district commissioner also has a priority plan. One may decide to concentrate on improving the district’s educational capabilities; another may see enhancing its economic resources as a priority, while another may decide to concentrate on the district’s vital infrastructure. Since NGOs have the responsibility for implementation, they must abide by and somehow address these local priorities. The projects are resumed after a discussion and
compromise between the two parties.

Unlike Afgoye, Kismayo serves as Jubaland state's interim headquarters (Bua’le, Jubaland’s capital city is controlled by al-Shabaab), with all the state’s ministries based there. However, this presents a new challenge. The lack of a clear or precise mandate within the ministries working on durable solutions leads to disagreements about project implementation and coordination.

6.2 Funds

Funding is essential for comprehensive and efficacious durable solutions plans and implementation. Lack of funds (or limited funding) has been a challenge for the NGOs implementing the durable solutions initiatives. As many organisations asserted during the data collection period, after the Ukraine war erupted, the world’s focus shifted to that crisis and caused some funding previously allocated for countries such as Somalia to be diverted to Ukraine. Due to an inability to pay salaries, some durable solutions projects were forced to stop, and a projected gap was declared. For instance, in Afgoye, the creation of the Community Action Plan has been put on hold because of a funding gap. More up-to-date data will need to be gathered again and community priorities examined if and when new durable solutions project funds are received in the future. A local government that creates the necessary infrastructure for durable solutions work, better coordination, improved security, and community-informed and evidence-based interventions would attract funding and donor priority in Afgoye, as is the case in Baidoa.

6.3 Insecurity

The biggest obstacle to implementing plans for long-lasting solutions is insecurity. Security concerns prevent the government and the international and local NGOs from going to the displaced communities and carrying out projects in Afgoye. The fragile security situation also delays the process for securing even the meagre funding and projects planned in Afgoye. Security concerns also prevent the Southwest Ministry of Planning’s Durable Solutions Unit from having an office and officers in the town. Local government officials in Afgoye, as well as NGO personnel, face the threat of indiscriminate explosions and attempted homicides. NGOs often devise methods to complete the necessary tasks in that district and return safely to Mogadishu.

This security challenge is also impeding the work of NGOs in the Afgoye district. They hire local NGOs such as Shabelle Community Development Organisation. Other NGOs in Kismayo would have preferred to work in Afmadow or Jilib districts. However, they are unable to do so because of safety issues.

6.4 Environmental shocks

Climate shocks have become a major barrier to the durable solutions work in the federal member states in Somalia. Droughts and floods have wiped out the livelihood of many families and increased displacements. After dry seasons, the Shabelle River breaks its banks as a result of poor maintenance and a lack of removal of detritus. The floods cause additional displacement.
Such displaced families then become a burden on the camps for IDPs set up earlier. Old settlements for IDPs can’t grow into a more sustainable phase since the new influx shifts attention away from them: thus, the previous IDPs find their past difficulties returning. Resilience and efforts to address the causes of displacement have been minimal.

### 6.5 Corruption

Government representatives in the designated aid recipient location often demand money from the aid agencies. Only the durable solutions programmes coordinated by regional government ministries are exempt from cash demands. Additionally, the aid agencies are unable to guarantee that the beneficiaries receive the full amount of aid intended. Following the distribution of aid, gatekeepers deal with the beneficiaries once more and collect their share, known as *Kalagoys*.

Some people's desire to receive cash or food vouchers presents a challenge for NGOs. Aid distribution might be halted if the NGOs refuse to hand out vouchers. And if those demanding them have weapons, the NGOs may even completely stop distribution. However, the regional governments now provide them with protection and police forces so that they can carry on with their work without interruption. Another difficulty is that the needs on the ground cannot all be met and covered by the NGOs. Not everyone is able to access help as a result.

### 6.6 Housing, land and property rights

The acquisition of land for IDPs and returnees in Afgoye is a concern for the regional government and NGOs. Because Afgoye is a lowland agricultural area, many open spaces are suitable for new settlement. Correspondingly, the proximity of Afgoye to Mogadishu has contributed to skyrocketing land prices, with a view to keeping the land to build factories and other infrastructure facilities. This raises the bar even higher for the government and the NGOs themselves, because in some cases the landowners are heirs whose decision to unanimously sell the land takes much longer. The Southwest regional government doesn't have spare land in Afgoye. The district is surrounded by farms and the farms are owned by individuals. The fragile security and the fear of al-Shabaab is another obstacle. Al-Shabaab sometimes intervene and call for cessation of the process on land matters.

At other times, land disputes among the host community prevent the government from building housing for IDPs and returnees. Numerous people show up to claim ownership of the lands once the regional government has granted them to IDPs or returnees and the aid organisations begin building the houses. At a minimum the project may be delayed, which would be the least detrimental outcome.

### 6.7 Inflation

The rising cost of construction equipment is a weakness in implementing durable solutions. At

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79 FGD participant, Afgoye, 23 August 2022.
the time of our research, the cost of a house that a typical family might live in in 2022 was much greater than that in 2021 due to the increased price of cement in Kismayo, which had gone up by $10 ($8 in 2021 and $18 in 2022). The Jubaland authorities have said that, no matter the price increase of the planned houses in Luglow, their design, which will consist of at least two rooms and a washroom, will not be compromised.

The ability of beneficiaries to save money has also been affected by inflation, which has an impact on durable solutions. Some IDPs have been able to purchase tuk tuks and bajaj with a cash assistance investment, and some are now able to drive local buses for a living. Since the prices of fuel and food have risen without their wages increasing, their income has decreased as a result. Their savings capacity has been affected; they, at the time of the data collection in 2022, only save about $1 per week, as opposed to the $8 they used to save per week in the past. Inflation has also affected the Ayuto method of saving money, in which the beneficiaries received an INGO-donated initial capital loan. The goal of Ayuto is to establish small businesses and ultimately pay back the loan.

6.8 Additional measures for further integration

IDPs and returnees participate in national and religious ceremonies with the host community, demonstrating social inclusion. However, the key challenge is economic inclusion. The key to IDPs and returnees fully integrating with host societies is gaining food and livelihood security through job creation. The provision of housing, social services, investment plans and farmland are other potential ways to increase integration.

Awareness of environmental protection and other public goods among the host community as well as IDPs and returnees is also important for integration. This will strengthen relationships between participants and teach them to work together towards a single goal, while fostering a sense of equality.

Building trust between the displaced community (IDPs and returnees) and the host community is essential; the host community believes that IDPs and returnees are the main cause of insecurity because they commit frequent robberies, while the latter group accuses the former of committing the same crime by attacking them in their camps while robbing and raping them. To put an end to this blame game and establish more amicable, open and friendly relationships, some of the participants in this study suggested creating and constructing football pitches and entertainment areas where the two can congregate and work together against insecurity while cultivating healthy bonds.

7 Key recommendations and action points

80 FGD participant, Afgoye, 28 August 2022.
This section presents recommendations and action points on ways the EU and other stakeholders might support the promotion of durable solutions at the federal member state level in Somalia.

**For the government**

1. The formation of a local durable solutions unit that coordinates durable solutions work at municipal levels. This will devolve the durable solutions work further to districts. The federal member states have not devolved key services and responsibilities to the districts, and the formation of durable solutions units at local levels would empower local governments. Local governments also work under their interior ministries, while durable solutions are often coordinated under the Ministry of Planning. Addressing this hierarchy challenge is also important.

2. Improved coordination between the durable solutions units in the FGS and the federal member states. A key element here is clarifying the level of engagement the FGS and member states should have with the EU. Regional states contend that they should work directly in coordinating the durable solutions with the EU, since EU-supported interventions should be signed and authorised where the interventions are implemented. The federal Ministry of Planning is also the gateway for the EU and other international partners. The reason regional states are demanding more autonomy relates to a lack of trust and a political rift between the centre and the periphery. The EU should balance these concerns and make sure that the trust is strengthened and that the communication, roles and coordination of the FGS and member states are clarified.

3. Settlement schemes that would help IDPs and returnees leave their camps permanently. While Luglow and New Kismayo settlement schemes are ongoing efforts, lessons can be learned from other settlements in Puntland and Somaliland. The IDP settlement scheme in Bososo, for instance, required the displaced family to live on the land they were given for 15 years. Those who did so were given ownership of their lands. This and similar conditions may help committed families within the displaced community get permanent land tenure. Such a scheme must be accompanied by livelihood opportunities.

4. The promotion of decentralised and effective interventions in job creation and employment schemes for IDPs and returnees, through support for relevant regional government institutions such as their ministries of labour, for local governments and for the private sector. This is believed to be an effective way to address the displacement crisis. If employment can enable the displaced community to pay rent, livelihood costs and school tuition fees, many could leave the IDP camps permanently and fully integrate with the local community. The EU could support government policies and actions on wages and compensation. Many of the displaced communities look for manual jobs daily and are often abused. The EU could support government efforts to protect displaced persons from their employers by closely collaborating with and supporting the regional ministries of labour and social affairs.
5. National security architecture and stabilisation efforts. If the displaced community can peacefully be returned to their residents, they would not need costly durable solutions schemes. Support could be given to the federal and regional governments in the liberation of the Middle Jubba region and the areas controlled by al-Shabaab in Jubaland and Southwest states.

6. Funding programmes dealing with climate shocks, in order for durable solutions responses to be effective. The creation of a trust fund for dealing with climate change closely coordinated with the newly formed federal Ministry of Environment and Climate Change might help provide a response to climate shocks. The EU also support NGOs and the media in promoting awareness of environmental protection and climate change.

7. The promotion of aid transparency efforts through the strengthening of accountability and fostering good governance. One reason why many government institutions dispute the durable solutions jurisdiction is the donor money involved. The EU should make sure that its funding does not enrich officials within government institutions.

For NGOs

1. The cash distribution approach should be reorganised. Cash vouchers are often distributed by local authorities and gatekeepers. There is no transparency on how the distribution is made. IDPs and returnees complain that the right people do not get the cash vouchers. Moreover, gatekeepers take back a percentage of the cash each person receives.

2. Tailored interventions for IDPs and returnees are needed. Newly displaced persons in particular have a different priority to long-term IDPs. IDPs’ priorities are also different in some ways from those of returnees. The latter, for instance, want integration, job opportunities and access to education and healthcare more than the IDPs, since they have come from places where they had access to these things. The EU could support interventions tailored for returnees and IDPs based on the context they live in and their needs.

3. The construction of football pitches for young people to advance integration among the IDPs, returnees and the host community is needed. Football tournaments among the youth of the IDPs, returnees and the host community could advance integration. Pitches and playgrounds can also be used to convene social gatherings and awareness events for the community.

4. Support for increasing the capacity of both relevant government institutions and the NGOs implementing the durable solutions interventions is required. The relevant government and nongovernmental institutions working on access to land, urban planning, construction, security, provision of basic services, emergency responses and integration need increased capacity. Strengthening the governance and reporting of local NGOs working on durable solutions, as well as the necessary skillsets required by
Examing the durable solutions capacities
In Kismayo and Afgoye

government personnel, should be supported. This also requires closer coordination with other international partners supporting durable solutions in Somalia’s regional states.

For the private sector

1. The private sector should be more engaged in resilience and development plans. The private sector often contributes cash and in-kind support when there are emergencies and new displacements. Its response is quick compared to that of the NGOs. The EU could support approaches towards the private sector on the implementation of the national durable solutions strategy.

2. More programmes are needed where NGOs partner and cooperate with the private sector in training IDPs and returnees in tailoring, solar systems, electrical skills, plumbing or nutrition. The NGOs and the private sector can then connect these trained people to the local companies that need their skills. NGOs do the training sometimes but networking and connecting those trained to the private sector is also important. It is imperative that NGOs provide such training and skills to the most committed individuals among the IDPs, returnees or the urban poor of the host community. In addition, the training should be efficient, suitable and provide the necessary qualifications and tools. The instructors and trainers should be qualified to provide the training.

3. More efforts are needed to advance access to affordable and quality education and healthcare in the regional states. The private sector plays a key role in the provision of education and healthcare in Somalia. Public–private partnership schemes for the provision of essential services, including markets for the displaced community, could address many of the access to service challenges that these communities face in Somalia’s federal member states.

4. Support for financing small businesses for the displaced community with the collaboration of commercial banks is crucial. The EU should explore ways to support those willing to establish small businesses by offering microfinance in close collaboration with commercial banks.
References


