Somalia adopted a federal system in 2004 when the Transitional Federal Charter was adopted in Kenya. Since then, it has evolved into a provisional constitution, which was temporarily approved by the over 800-member constitutional assembly in Mogadishu in 2012. The devolution of power has exposed Somalia to recurrent disputes between the FGS and its constituent units over power and resource distribution. At the heart of a bitter and draining schism and bone of contention between the levels of government is fiscal federalism. This results from ambiguity inherent in the Somalia Provisional Constitution over this and other crucial matters. As this problem grows, this study sheds light on the state of fiscal federalism in Somalia, and the challenges that stand in the way of a workable agreement. However, it also proposes practical models and recommendations in resolving the existing disputes over fiscal federalism.
On May 27, members of the National Consultative Council (NCC) signed an election agreement in Mogadishu. The agreement, which consists of eight points and a roadmap for the post-election government, addresses the core outstanding issues of the indirect elections. The Prime Minister took the lead of the electoral process after the House of the People rescinded early last month a two- year extension it announced on 12 April and the President handed over the election management and security to him. The agreement includes a way forward for the election implementation teams, the election of Somaliland seats, the management of elections in Gedo, election security, women’s quota, and an election timeline. This brief examines the agreed framework and its limitations. It also analyses the implementation challenges of the agreed indirect election such as budget, security, the composition of electoral delegates, and logistical challenges. It also puts forward a number of recommendations that, if implemented, could enhance the transparency and outcome of Somalia’s approaching indirect elections.
Over the past decades, donors, aid agencies, consultants and enumerators have conducted increasing amounts of aid-related research in the form of monitoring, assessments and surveys in Somalia. The rise of third-party monitoring (TPMs), new technologies and the arrival of global consultancy firms have not only led to an internationalised and professionalised market for aid information but also introduced new power dynamics in the production of aid knowledge. The way in which aid data in Somalia/Somaliland is produced reflects prevailing stereotypes about the supposedly superior value of ‘Western’ expertise over local knowledge. This brief raises important questions about the production and ownership of aid- related knowledge in the Somali territories where, due to weak state institutions, data collection is unregulated, and often de facto privatised. Moreover, the insufficient uptake of aid information by aid agencies, the governments and the public gives pause for thought. As Somali government institutions are strengthening, there is an urgent need to localise knowledge production in Somalia and to make aid information and data available to the public. There is also a need to strengthen data protection and research ethics and to rethink some of the extractive and negative impacts of the current aid information business.
The roads to reconciliation and state formation in Galmudug have been difficult. The federal government – through the Ministry of Interior, Fed- eral Affairs, and Reconciliation – took the lead in establishing a new state for Galmudug in early 2019. It started with a 12-member social reconciliation committee that convened the 11 clans in Galmudug and helped them select the state legislators. The reconciliation of the Huurshe-Heraale conflict was a notable success of these efforts. A controversial presidential election which was boycotted by most of the candidates followed reconciliation at community levels. However, the elected president Qoorqoor led the state in a positive direction by initiating a political reconciliation process. Before his inauguration, he reached agreements with opposition politicians who had been candidates for the presidency, and former Galmudug President Haaf. ASWJ leaders left Dhusamareb after the SNA overpowered their forces. A state cabinet seen by many as being inclusive was appointed, and within a few months Galmudug saw itself playing an important role in national politics by convening conferences between FGS and FMS leaders on the subject of federal elections.
Notwithstanding these promising reconciliation efforts, the state is still fragile and the challenges it faces are numerous. Addressing the root causes of clan conflicts, managing the election of the federal MPs whose constituency is Galmudug, and security sector re- form, among many others, will define Galmudug’s future.
In partnership with Interpeace.
There has been controversy surrounding the development of new legislation in Somalia addressing sexual offences, at a time when incidences of rape and other sexual violence have become rampant and impunity is pervasive. Two different bills on sexual offences have been drafted by different sources. However, the content and implications of each bill have not been adequately explained in public, leading to tensions fed by confusion and misapprehension rather than informed discussion. This brief outlines the content of each bill and draws out the key comparisons and differences. It recommends harmonizing the two bills, conducting wider public awareness activities on the proposed legislation, aligning the legislation to Somalia’s Penal Code, and strengthening the judiciary, police, and prosecution institutions.
Muran ayaa ka taagnaa u sameynta sharci cusub Soomaaliya oo wax looga qabanayo dembiyada galmada, xilli dhacdooyinka kufsiga iyo xadgudubyada kale ee galmada ay noqdeen kuwo aad u baahsan. Laba hindise- sharciyeed oo kala duwan oo ku saabsan dembiyada galmada ayey diyaariyeen xafiisyo kala duwan. Nuxurka iyo saameynta nindise- sharciyeed kasta si fiican looguma sharrixin dadweynaha, taasoo horseedday xiisado ku qotama jahwareer iyo fahan-xumo halkii ay habooneyd dood xog-ogaalnimo ku dhisan in laga yeesho. Qoraalkan wuxuu qeexayaa waxa ku qoran hindise-sharciyeed kasta wuxuuna soo bandhigayaa isbarbardhigyada iyo kala duwanaanshiyaha muhiimka ah. Qormadu waxey ku talineysaa in la is waafajiyo labada hindise-sharciyeed, in la sameeyo wacyigelin ballaaran oo ku saabsan sharciga lagu taliyey, in sharciga la waafajiyo Xeerka Ciqaabta Soomaaliya, lana xoojiyo garsoorka, booliska, iyo hay’adaha dacwad-oogista.
Protecting progress that has already been made in Somalia’s post-conflict transition should be the main priority of the upcoming electoral process. Significantly, Somalis have already achieved agreement on the main aspects of the process through intensive dialogue, which represents a major hurdle that has been negotiated. As well as this, the elections can also help to further expand participation and representation in Somalia’s political structures, which would be another step forward—albeit small—in Somalia’s post-conflict trajectory.
These successes are not yet guaranteed. The process comes at the tail-end of a period of heightened political tensions in Somalia, between the FGS and some federal member states, notably Jubaland and Puntland, as well as between the FGS and opposition politicians. The agreement struck in September is fragile, and, in the absence of trust, the contentious issues outlined above may derail the process. There is a high chance that the elections become protracted and contested, increasing the likelihood that the result is disputed.
These are worst-case scenarios and are avoidable if the spirit of consensus reached in September amongst the Somali political leadership can be revitalized and deepened. Constant political dialogue between Somali leaders from different sides of the spectrum on the issues outlined here is essential to build trust, relationships and channels of communication that can be the basis for a credible process, and mediation of political differences. This might take place in the form of a monthly meeting of political leaders whilst the election campaign is underway, as well as regular meetings or conference calls between technical advisors from the different groups.
In la ilaaliyo horumarkii horay loogu sameeyay marxaladda isbeddelka doorashada ee Soomaaliya waa in uu noqdaa mudnaanta koowaad ee hannaanka doorashooyinka soo socda. Muhiimad ahaan, Soomaalidu waxay hore heshiis uga gaareen arrimaha ugu muhiimsan ee geeddi-socodka doorashada iyadoo loo marayo wadahadal. Sidoo kale, doorashadu waxay kaloo gacan ka gaysan kartaa sii ballaarinta ka-qaybgalka iyo metelaadda siyaasadeed ee Soomaaliya, taasoo noqon doonta tallaabo kale oo horey loo qaado – in kasta oo ay yar tahay.
Guulahaan weli lama damaanad qaadin. Hannaanka doorashada ayaa kusoo aadaya dabayaaqada xilli ay ka jiraan Soomaaliya xiisado siyaasadeed oo xoogeystay ee u dhexeeya dowladda federaalka iyo qaar ka mid ah dowladaha xubnaha ka ah dowladda federaalka, gaar ahaan Jubaland iyo Puntland, iyo sidoo kale khilaaf u dhexeeya dowladda federaalka iyo siyaasiyiinta mucaaradka. Heshiiskii la gaaray bishii Sebteember waa mid nugul, maadaama aanu kalsooni badan heysanin, arrimaha lagu muransan yahay ee kor ku xusan ayaana carqaladeyn kara hannaanka doorashada. Waxaa jirta ifafaalo ah in doorashooyinka ay noqdaan kuwo daba dheeraada, taasoo kordhinaysa suuragalnimada in natiijada doorashadu noqoto mid lagu murmo.
Kuwani waa xaaladaha ugu xun ee dhici kara waana kuwo laga fogaan karo haddii dareenka adag ee heshiiskii la gaarey bishii Sebteambar ee u dhexeeyey hoggaamiyaasha siyaasadda ee Soomaaliya dib loosoo nooleyn karo lanasii ballaarin karo. Wadahadal siyaasadeed oo joogta ah oo u dhexeeya madaxda Soomaalida ee ka kala socda dhinacyada kala duwan ee arrimaha halkan lagu xusey ayaa lagama maarmaan u ah dhismaha kalsooni, xiriiro iyo wadiiqooyin isgaarsiineed oo gundhig u noqon kara hannaan lagu kalsoonaan karo, iyo dhexdhexaadinta khilaafaadka iyo kala duwanaanshaha siyaasadeed. Tani waxa ay u dhici kartaa qaab kulan bille ah oo u dhexeeya hoggaamiyaasha siyaasadda inta ololaha doorashada uu socdo, iyo sidoo kale shirar caadiga ah ee u dhexeeya lataliyeyaasha farsamada ee siyaasiyiinta kala duwan.
Somalia is heading into another indirect election in 2020-21. It is a familiar process and one that was undertaken almost four years ago. Many lessons can be learned from the 2016 indirect electoral implementation process. In 2016, candidates for the House of the People of Somali Federal Parliament covered some important logistics, travel and accommodation costs for the electoral delegates (which in part is believed to have helped them get elected); there was no scheduled time for meetings between candidates and the voting delegates; and the date and time for voting of each seat of the House of the People was unilaterally decided by the state election implementation teams. In 2016, the proportion of women in parliament was increased from 14% to 24%, which was a significant increase. This was one of the positives of the 2016 indirect elections and similar efforts could be made this time around to raise this to the 30% female quota target. This brief analyses the implementation process of the 2016 indirect elections and concludes with policy considerations. These include: prohibiting candidates to handpick electoral delegates; providing the necessary logistical and accommodation support to the delegates on time; arranging a formal campaign schedule for voters and candidates; publishing the election schedule for each seat of the House of the People in advance; allowing the media and election observers to be present during the voting, and monitoring and reporting irregularities and fraudulent practices throughout the election process.
Soomaaliya waxa ay galeysaa doorasho dadban mar labaad sanadka 2020-21. Waa hannaan la yaqaanno oo la qabtay ku dhowaad afar sano kahor. Casharro badan ayaa laga baran karaa geeddi-socodkii hirgelinta doorashooyinkii dadbanaa ee 2016. Sanadkii 2016, qaar kamid ah musharraxiinta Golaha Shacabka ee Baarlamaanka Federaalka Soomaaliya ayaa bixiyey kharashaadka saadka sida safarka iyo hoyga loogu talagalay ergooyinka doorashada (taasoo qeyb ahaan la rumeysan yahay inay ka caawisay doorashadooda); ma jirin wakhti loo qorsheeyey kulamada musharraxiinta iyo ergooyinka; taariikhda iyo wakhtiga loo codeynayo kursi kasta oo kamid ah Golaha Shacabka waxaa go’aamiyay hal dhinac oo ah kooxaha fulinaya doorashooyinka. Sanadkii 2016, qoondada haweenka ee baarlamaanka ayaa oo markii hore ahaa 14% ayaa laga dhigay 24%, taasoo ahayd koror aad u weyn. Tani waxa ay ahayd mid kamid ah waxyaabihii wanaagsanaa ee kasoo baxay doorashadii dadbanayd ee 2016; dadaallada noocan oo kale ah ayaa sidoo kale la samayn karaa markan si sare loogu qaado saamiga lana gaarsiiyo hiigsiga qoondada haweenka ee ah 30%. Faalladan kooban waxaa uu falanqeynayaa hannaankii hirgelinta doorashooyinkii dadbanaa ee 2016, waxaana uu soo jeedinayaa talooyin tixgelin mudan oo ay kamid yihiin: ka mamnuucidda musharixiinta in ay gacan ku yeeshaan xulista ergooyinka doorashada; in wakhtigeeda lagu bixiyo saadka loo baahan yahay iyo hoyga ergada; diyaarinta jadwalka ololaha rasmiga ah ee cod-bixiyeyaasha iyo musharraxiinta; daabacaadda jadwalka doorashada ee kursi kasta xilli hore; u oggolaanshaha warbaahinta iyo kormeerayaasha doorashada in ay goobjoog ka ahaadaan xilliga cod-bixinta, iyo la socoshada iyo soo gudbinta khaladaadka inta lagu guda jiro hannaanka doorashada.
The Covid-19 pandemic spread across Somalia and again exposed the fragility of public institutions. There are limited laboratories that can be used to test the Covid-19 samples. The number of samples tested was minimal in number, and the positive, recovered, and death numbers reported likely do not reflect the actual number of people who contracted the virus and the actual deaths from the coronavirus. The national Covid-19 response was understandably minimal, and was/is only limited to Mogadishu, the seats of regional states, and few other major towns. Although some governance measures were employed by the federal government and federal member states, these measures were poorly enforced due to the weak enforcement capacity of public institutions. There have been some financial and in-kind support to Covid-19 response, but transparency and accountability mechanisms relating to how these resources have been used are not clear. The Covid-19 pandemic became one among many pressing priorities for the recovering public sector institutions in Somalia, and one key lesson from the pandemic relates to the need for investment in both governing institutions and the delivery of public services. The pandemic may come to an end, but it could inspire leaders to invest more in increasing access to and quality of public services in Somalia.
Cudurka safmareenka ee Covid-19 wuxuu ku faafay Soomaaliya oo dhan wuxuuna mar kale kashifay jilicsanaanta hay’adaha dowliga ah. Waxaa jira shaybaarro yar oo loo isticmaali karo in lagu baaro cudurka Covid-19. Tirada dadka la baaray ayaa tiro ahaan aad u yaraa, tirada laga helay, iyo tirada dhimashada ee la soo sheegay waxay u egtahay inaysan ka tarjumaynin tirada dhabta ah ee dadka uu ku dhacay fayraska iyo dhimashada dhabta ah ee uu sababay coronavirus. Guddiga heer Qaran ee Covid-19 tamartiisu waxay ahayd mid aad u yar, kaliyana ku eg Muqdisho, caasimadaha dowlad-goboleedyada iyo magaalooyin kale oo waaweyn. Inkastoo dhowr tallaabo oo maamul ay ku dhawaaqeen dowladda dhexe iyo dowladaha xubnaha ka ah federaalka, haddana tallaabooyinkan si liidata ayaa loo dhaqan geliyey sababtoo ah awoodda fulinta ee hay’adaha dowladda ayaa daciif ah. Waxaa jiray xoogaa taageero maaliyadeed iyo mid agab ah oo loogu tala galay la tacalida xaladda Covid-19, balse daahfurnaan badan ma jirin qaabka islaxisaabtankana ma ahayn mid cadaynaya sida wax loo isticmaalay. COVID-19 wuxuu noqday mid kamid ah arrimaha culus ee mudnaanta ay siiyeen hay’adaha dowliga ah ee Soomaaliya. Hal cashar oo muhiim ah oo laga bartay musiibada ayaa la xiriirta baahida loo qabo dhisidda hay’adaha dowliga ah iyo gaarsiinta adeegyada bulshada. Aafada waa lasoo afjari karaa, laakiin waxay ku dhiirigelin kartaa hoggaamiyeyaasha inay maalgeliyaan kordhinta helitaanka iyo tayada adeegyada bulshada ee Soomaaliya.
Soon after the first few cases of COVID-19 were confirmed in Somalia, schools and higher education institutions were forced to close down their campuses in a bid to reduce infections. Universities explored online teaching as an alternative approach to continue teaching and learning. This governance brief explores how COVID-19 impacted the higher education sector in Mogadishu. The brief puts special emphasis on universities’ shift to online instruction; how the teaching of arts, social science as well as science, technology, engineering, and maths (STEM) disciplines are affected; issues around digital divides; financial hardships of universities; online teaching challenges; and exams integrity. The paper concludes with policy considerations including universities to invest in Edtech; observe exam integrity; and to look for other sources to reduce dependence on students’ tuition fees and maintain operations.
Kadib markii kiisaskii ugu horreeyay ee COVID-19 laga xaqiijiyey Soomaaliya, iskuullada iyo jaamacadaha waxaa lagu qasbay in ay xiraan xarumahooda si loo yareeyo faafidda fayraska. Jaamacaduhu waxay sahminayeen waxbarista internet-ka si aanay u joogsan waxbarashada. Faalladan waxay baareysaa sida uu COVID-19 u saameeyay jaamacadaha Muqdisho. Warbixintu waxa ay si gaar ah xoogga u saareyaa u weecashada jaamacadaha ee waxbarista internet- ka; sida culuumta arts-ka, cilmiga bulshada iyo seyniska, tiknooloojiyadda, injineeriyada, iyo xisaabtu u saameeyay COVID-19; arrimaha ku saabsan u sinnaan la’aanta isticmaalka tiknooloojiyadda; dhibaatooyinka maaliyadeed ee jaamacadaha; iyo caqabadaha waxbarista internet-ka; iyo hufnaanta imtixaannada. Faalladu waxa ay ku talineysaa in jaamacaduhu maalgashadaan tiknooloojiyadda; ilaalinta hufnaanta imtixaanka; iyo in la raadiyo ilo dhaqaale kale si loo yareeyo ku tiirsanaanta jaamacadaha ee lacagaha ardeyda laga qaado.
The findings of the radio discussions reveal that there were a number of things that went wrong in the 2019 flood response. First, there was no reliable data on the number of people displaced by the flooding, and where the locations from and to which they were displaced. This led to the irregular distribution of emergency relief. Second, some local committees and individuals responsible for the distribution of the majority of the emergency relief that people experienced used clan criteria for the selection of beneficiaries, which excluded important segments of the society such as the IDPs, people with disabilities, and women. Third, there was disorganization among the multiple actors who were distributing aid. As a result, some families and individuals received food and cash several times while others did not receive any relief. Fourth, there was a lack of awareness among both local people and volunteer responders of the physical risks presented by the flooded terrain. As a result, some people died in the water. Finally, there were no institutions or mechanisms formed before the flooding to handle the response. This led to disorganized multiple actors distributing aid based on the criteria they set themselves or directed by the groups that sent the assistance.