Three years ago, on 15 May 2022, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected as the President of Somalia after a protracted indirect electoral process. This was his non-consecutive second period in office—he had first served between September 2012 and February 2017. His return was hailed as a positive sign. He was seen as an experienced president who had gained valuable insights from his nearly five years in office, had spent another five years in the opposition, and was likely to have drawn lessons from the mistakes of his first term. As such, he seemed poised to reset the course and leave a lasting legacy. However, he was about to face very familiar governance and security challenges, including the threat from al-Shabaab, heavy donor dependency for financing the government budget, a deeply polarized political settlement, a volatile and fluid context combined with the competing interests of foreign powers jostling for influence in the country, among many other factors. During his presidential campaign trail, Hassan Sheikh promised that he would prioritize reforms, including finalizing the constitution, reconciliation within and outside, premised on his famous slogan “Soomaali heshiis ah, dunidana heshiis la ah,” (loosely translating to “Somalis at peace with themselves and at peace with the outside world”) and a shift towards democratic governance.

As his administration enters its final year, the key question is this: how much progress has been made over the last three years, and what can the President and his administration realistically achieve before 15 May 2026? This commentary reviews the past three years, focusing on major achievements, setbacks and challenges, and policy priorities for the year ahead.

Key Achievements

Appointing a Prime Minister, cabinet ministers and special envoys were the focus of the first several months of President Hassan Sheikh’s administration. Achievements started in late 2022 when the government supported and joined forces with local Macawisley forces in the Hiiraan region to fight against al-Shabaab. The fight against al-Shabaab continued for the most part of 2023. The President spent months in Dhusamareb, the capital city of Galmudug State, to coordinate the offensive operations, and the government managed to capture key towns from al-Shabaab including Adan Yabal and Runirgood in the Middle Shabelle region and Harardhere in the Mudug region, and Galcad and Wabho in the Galgaduud region. This was done in parallel with efforts to end the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) mission and takeover their forward operating bases. This didn’t quite happen. Instead, ATMIS was later renamed as the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) with what was initially significantly reduced number of troops. However, the more recent Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) meeting in Kampala in April 2025 recommended the surge of an additional 8,000 to deal with the prevailing security situation in Somalia.

Another domestic development that can be categorized as a partial achievement related to the continuous meetings of the National Consultative Council (NCC) members and political agreements on key contentious political issues including power allocation, judiciary model, fiscal federalism, national security architecture, and elections. These political agreements were prerequisites for the constitutional review bodies – Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (ICRIC) and parliamentary Oversight Committee (OC) – to review and finalize the provisional federal constitution. It was also important for efforts to conduct direct elections. However, the constitutional amendment process and efforts toward democratization are still works in progress and faced critical political challenges in the process.

Externally, the federal government reached several milestones, mostly in 2023 and in 2024. Somalia joined the East African Community (EAC) in November 2023, becoming the eighth member of the regional bloc. Significantly, after 31 years, on 1 December 2023, the United Nations Security Council lifted the arms embargo on the Somali Armed Forces and the Federal Government of Somalia. The government also concluded the debt relief process on 13 December 2023 through the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and managed to secure a $4.5 billion debt forgiveness. Somalia also managed to secure a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the 2025–2026 term after 54 years of absence. This was achieved through securing more than the required two-thirds majority votes (179 votes) in the UN General Assembly voting in June 2024.

Setbacks and Critical Challenges

Although some of these efforts (such as the debt relief process and joining the UN Security Council as a non-permanent seat) started during previous governments, such achievements abroad were rare in Somalia’s recent history. However, there were critical setbacks domestically.

Firstly, the offensives against al-Shabaab were critically damaged by the Owsweyne debacle in late August 2023. The Somali National Army (SNA) suffered a significant setback in Owsweyne when al-Shabaab launched a coordinated early morning attack on an SNA encampment, employing multiple suicide car bombs followed by a ground assault. Many government soldiers lost their lives in this attack, and the government offensives were never the same after this. But even before the Owsweyne debacle, offensives had already stalled. Osweyn was a setback in part because SNA faced challenges around supply lines, coordination of newly trained forces, and issues of morale and decimation in Gorgor and Danab after they had taken key hits, including at Galad when Major Hassan Mohamed Osman (Tuurre) was killed. It also affected the planned ATMIS drawdown timelines.

When Ethiopia’s Prime Minister signed a controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the former President of Somaliland on 1 January 2024, the federal government deviated its focus from the al-Shabaab offensives and entered a diplomatic tussle with Ethiopia, which lasted for almost a year. The MoU not only distracted  the FGS focus, but it also created an opportunity for AS to appeal for new recruits to allegedly fight against Ethiopia. The Owsweyne setback, the distraction caused by the MoU, and now the FGS approaching its final year all contributed to AS’s new offensives in early 2025 and the recapture of villages and towns the government had recovered in 2022 and 2023. This is the classic one step forward and one step backward notion that has often been used to describe security and political developments in Somalia.

Secondly, the NCC efforts to agree on contentious political issues led to a rift between the center and federal member states. The NCC political agreements on power allocation and judiciary model in December 2022 created friction between the FGS leadership and the Puntland President, who saw the agreement as overcentralization of both executive powers and the judiciary. When he returned to Garowe, the Puntland administration issued a position paper criticizing the political agreements as efforts to centralize powers. For close to two and a half years, the Puntland President did not participate in NCC meetings and has not signed any of the political agreements the NCC signed. When the federal parliament voted for amendments to the first four chapters of the constitution on 30 March 2024, Puntland cut ties with the FGS and stated that it only recognizes the 2012 Provisional Federal Constitution.

Thirdly, the 27 May 2023 political agreement on elections created another political challenge. The agreement proposed two political parties, three electoral models for local council, parliamentary and presidential elections, a vice president, unified election management, and a president elected by the public rather than the parliament. The agreement became a baseline for the constitutional review committees’ revision of the constitution. It became the core of Chapter Four of the amended four chapters of the constitution. However, the changes made to the 27 May 2023 agreement included a prime minister that the President could sack in the place of a vice president and three national political parties instead of two. The parliamentary endorsement of the changes led to the drafting and approval of three election laws and the establishment of the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission.

While Puntland continued to be outside of the federally led constitutional amendment and electoral processes, the Jubaland President left the NCC and organized a unilateral FMS election in Kismayo in November 2024, which the FGS opposed. The FGS contended that it wanted harmonized elections starting with local council elections, followed by FMS direct elections and then national elections (even though the current mandates of FMS Presidents had expired). The Jubaland President preferred securing his mandate first, as the FGS-led democratization efforts were behind schedule (such as the 30 June 2024 date initially agreed upon to conduct local council elections).

Despite Puntland and Jubaland state leaders’ opposition to the electoral process, the FGS and the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC) started voter registration in Mogadishu and plan to expand the voter registration to some Federal Member States and to conduct local council elections. Apart from the two FMS Presidents, core political stakeholders including former Presidents and Prime Ministers continue to oppose the FGS-led electoral process.

With one year remaining, the FGS is racing against time. After three years, the constitutional amendment process and elections—the two main domestic priorities for the federal government since it came to power—remain unfinished business. What can it realistically do in the one remaining year?

Priorities for the Year Ahead

The FGS needs to first realize that the current One Person, One Vote (OPOV) election roadmap will not be realistically implemented in one year due to a rudimentary election infrastructure and lack of enough political agreement for conducting such elections. After this realization, the FGS can prioritize security, improving FMS relations, and an agreement on the next political transition.

First, the FGS leadership should ensure security by withdrawing the SNA to more defensive positions. This would allow it to focus on a real programme of security reform that can deter further gains from AS, and reduce the impact of uncertainty around the size and timeframe of  AUSSOM. Alternatively, President Hassan Sheikh could come out much more publicly in favour of increased AUSSOM funding. While security strategies can continue, political dialogue and political reconciliation would strengthen the fight against AS. The President can capitalize on the national unity dialogue he recently announced to ensure that stakeholders discuss and have clarity on the next political transition.

Second, the FGS leadership should sit with Puntland and Jubaland Presidents and reconcile their differences. With elections approaching, these states will be critical for the election of 99 members (about one-third) of the federal parliament (House of the People and the Upper House)—although the newly recognized SSC-Khatumo will likely serve as the electoral constituency for a number of seats originally elected in Garowe. Recognizing the President of Jubaland could lead to a departure from the current electoral process and pave the way for organizing similar indirect elections for FMS Presidents. This would allow incumbents to renew their mandate or open up the field to new contenders who would then be able to play a role in federal elections.

Third, the FGS, through the NCC, should engage opposition politicians and civil society actors to explore middle ground options for the federal parliamentary elections. While the OPOV elections at all levels of government – local, state & federal levels – seem impossible to be completed in one year, most of the political stakeholders also agree that going back to the 2021–22 indirect elections is not a preferable option. Therefore, exploring an enhanced model would require the wisdom and insights of multiple stakeholders.

Clarity on the next political dispensation early on will save Somalia from a repeat of the 2021’s flare up of political violence in Mogadishu around the indirect elections. Avoiding a repeat of that situation – given Somalia’s current security landscape – should be an imperative for all government actors.